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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS

Evidence from firms in 47 countries shows that companies connected with officials have
higher leverage and higher market shares, but they underperform nonconnected companies
on an accounting basis. Differences between connected and unconnected firms become
particularly pronounced when political links are stronger, and when connected firms operate
in countries with higher levels of corruption.
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I. Introduction
Despite the negative aggregate economic effect of corruption on aggregate investment
and growth, a growing recent literature has pointed out that political connections may be
beneficial to specific firms. There are plenty of anecdotes in the press identifying some of the
possible sources of connected firms’ relative advantage. In Indonesia, for example, a
condition for IMF lending in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis was that Suharto
would sign an agreement that made companies controlled by his family give up lucrative
government concessions, monopolies, licenses, government contracts, and tax breaks that
protected them from competition in their domestic market.1 Such benefits were found to be
huge. In fact, when the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency published the names of
Indonesia's main corporate borrowers, Suharto's children figured on the top of the list:
“Second on the list, with 3.5 trillion rupiah in loans, is Timor Putra Nasional, the auto firm
controlled by Tommy Suharto. Number five, with 2.9 trillion rupiah in debt, is a
petrochemical company owned by the timber tycoon Prajogo Pangestu and Suharto's second
son, Bambang Trihatmodjo.”2
Despite a large number of such anecdotes in the press, academic studies reporting
evidence on the sources of value of connections are limited to a few “benefits” such as
preferential access to credit (Chiu and Joh, 2004, Cull and Xu, 2005, Dinç, 2005, Johnson
and Mitton, 2003, and Khwaja and Mian, 2005), regulatory protection (Kroszner and
Stratmann, 1998), and government aid to financially troubled firms (Faccio, Masulis and
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Rosenthal, A. M., “What Suharto Knew,” The New York Times, 10 March 1998. Pura, Raphael, “Rising

Resentment: Scrutiny of Suharto Wealth Is Intensifying in Jakarta,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 1 June 1998.
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Arnold, Wayne, “Indonesia's repo man: Eko Budianto has ordered corporate cronies from the Suharto regime

to pay back the billions they owe Indonesian banks or he'll seize their assets, even if it means enlisting the army
to help him,” The New York Times, 31 July 1999.
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McConnell, 2006). Additionally, most of these studies look at individual countries,3 and
highly dissimilar types of connections, making any crosscountry comparison virtually
impossible.
By contrast, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of connected firms
across a large set of countries. In particular, I focus on characteristics that are likely to reflect
benefits in terms of access to credit, tax discounts and market protection/monopolies. I have
two main questions: First, are these alleged benefits common across countries, or are they
specific of a few countries/types of connections? Second, are these benefits larger in
countries with high corruption?
To address these questions, I use a new database built in Faccio (2006) that includes
several thousand firms in 47 countries. A company is defined as connected with a politician
if at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting
shares) or one of its top directors (CEO, president, vicepresident, or secretary) is a member
of parliament, or a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party.

Close

relationships can be through friendship, former heads of state or prime ministers, past
directorships held, foreign politicians, or longstanding relationships with political parties.
As recognized in Faccio (2006), relying on publicly available data sources yields an
incomplete picture of connections. However, it seems reasonable to believe that those
identified through public sources are more likely to represent durable ties (as opposed to
campaign contributions).
I find that connected firms have higher leverage (which proxies preferential access to the
credit market), pay lower taxes (which proxies tax discounts), and have stronger market
power (which proxies for monopolies, government contracts, and protection in general), but
poorer accounting performance than nonconnected firms. They differ more dramatically
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The lone exception is Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006).
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from their peers when their political links are stronger. Differences are greater, for example,
when companies are connected through owners rather than directors. Similarly, they are
greater when the connection is with a minister, rather than with a member of the parliament.
I additionally find that the financial characteristics of connected firms differ more from those
of their nonconnected peers in countries characterized by high levels of corruption. Results
are robust to tests for reverse causality, outliers, the exclusion of individual countries and
industries.
These results indicate that the distortions in the allocation of public resources often
claimed by practitioners are common in both emerging and developed countries. However,
the magnitude of this phenomenon is much larger in more corrupt systems. This last result is
consistent with Faccio (2006) who, for a large sample of connections across developed and
emerging markets, documents that firm value increases when an entrepreneur is elected to a
top political position, especially in highly corrupt countries. Overall, this suggests caution in
making inferences on the value and the size or frequency of benefits of political ties based on
evidence from individual countries.
This works complements a growing literature studying the net effect of political
connections on the value of firms. This evidence has largely shown that, on average, benefits
exceed the costs. For example, Fisman’s (2001) study of connections to Indonesian President
Suharto shows that rumors of worsening in the health of Suharto significantly (and
negatively) affected the prices of companies related to the President. Studies by Roberts
(1990) and Goldman, Rocholl and So (2006) provide evidence that connections through
campaign contributions on average add to the value of US firms.4 Ramalho (2003) and
Feguson and Voth (2006) provide similar evidence for firms related to Brazilian Brazilian
4

Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2006), however, report that the value of companies tightly connected to

Vice President Cheney is not affected by major health events involving the Vice President, or major political
news.
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President Collor de Mello, and German firms affiliated to the Nazi party (during its rise to
power), respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, I define political connections.
Section III presents evidence on the characteristics of connected firms. Section IV discusses
the crosscountry evidence. Section V provides a number of robustness tests. Section VI
addresses reverse causality issues. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.

II. Definition of political connections.
Data on political ties come from Faccio (2006), who analyzes political connections
across 47 countries. In particular, a company is defined as politically connected if at least one of
its large blockholders (anyone directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of voting rights) or
one of its top directors (e.g., CEO, president, etc) is a government minister or a head of state, or is
closely related to a top politician or political party, or is a member of parliament.
Connections with government ministers include cases in which the politician himself is a
director or a large shareholder, as well as cases where a politician’s close relative covers such
positions.

Close relationships include cases of friendship; former heads of state or prime ministers5
as well as former directorships held by current politicians; foreign politicians; and well
known relationships with political parties (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; and Johnson and Mitton,
2003). These connections need to involve the politician personally.
Finally, I include cases in which a member of parliament serves as a company’s CEO,
president, vicepresident, or secretary, or controls at least 10 percent of shareholder votes.
Because of data limitations, connections with a member of parliament are recorded only
when members of parliament themselves are shareholders or top directors, but do not
consider cases when such positions are held by relatives.

6

To establish the presence of connections, names of members of parliament or
government are identified using the Chiefs of State directory (CIA, 2001) and the official
website of the country’s government and parliament. Names of top company directors are
taken from Worldscope, Extel, company websites, and LexisNexis. Major shareholders are
identified from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), the web sites
of the stock exchanges or their supervisory authorities, Worldscope, and Extel.

The

Economist, Forbes and Fortune are the sources of information for wellknown cases of
friendships. Additionally, studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Backman (1999), Gomez
and Jomo (1997), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and Fisman (2001) are used to identify close
relationships of the types listed above.
The dataset built in Faccio (2006) identifies 541 companies with political connections in
47 countries. To be included in the sample, financial information for these companies needs
to be available in Worldscope for 1997. This reduces the sample to 458 connected firms, and
15,733 nonconnected peers. Overall, there are 514 connections, as some companies have
multiple ties. Of these, 307 connections (60%) involve top directors, while 207 cases (40%)
involve large shareholders. In the majority of cases (304, or 59%) connections are with
members of parliament, followed by close relationships (132 cases, or 26%) and connections
with government ministers or heads of state (78 cases, or 15%).
Table 1 shows the country distribution of connections. The full list of connections is
available at http://www2.owen.vanderbilt.edu/marafaccio/AERConnectedFirms.xls.
[Table 1 goes about here]
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See from http://www2.owen.vanderbilt.edu/marafaccio/AppendixA.doc for data sources.

7

III. The characteristics of politically connected firms
This section studies the characteristics of connected firms, in terms of (i) leverage, (ii)
taxation, (iii) market power, (iv) accounting performance, and (v) markettobook ratio.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to point out that at least three factors
work against finding any statistical significance. First, to the extent that high leverage or low
taxation reflects a benefit, this benefit may accrue mostly to unlisted firms connected with
politicians. Since financial data are not widely available for unlisted firms, I cannot test this
hypothesis. Second, benefits may be granted industry wide, rather than to specific firms.
This is often true in the case of barriers to entry and tax relief. Stigler (1971) discusses
several such cases in the U.S. Third, since many connected firms may operate as monopolies
or quasimonopolies, their industryadjusted financial ratios will be exactly the same as those
of their “peers.”
A. Leverage.
Leverage is a proxy for access to debt financing. Leverage is defined as the ratio of
longterm debt (excluding the current portion of longterm debt, pensions, deferred taxes, and
minority interest) to total capital × 100. Total capital represents the total investment in the
company. It is the sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, longterm debt,
nonequity reserves, and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves.
To investigate the relationship between connectedness and leverage, all connections are
initially pooled together (Table 3, Panel A); next, they are split between (i) connections
through the owner and connections through a director (Panel B), or (ii) connections with the
king, president or minister, connections with members of parliament and/or close
relationships (Panel C).
Unless otherwise specified, all regressions control for whether the company is dually
listed, recently privatized, or statecontrolled, as well as size (market capitalization), country,
8

and industry, defined according to Campbell (1996).6 Dual listings (e.g., whether a company
is listed on at least two stock markets) are identified from Worldscope. Lists of privatized
firms are obtained from SDC Platinum; Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2001), Dewenter
and Malatesta (1997), and Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994), and are
additionally updated with data kindly provided by Professor Megginson. Extel, Worldscope,
Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and the 2000 “Fortune 500 Global List” are
used to identify government ownership.
Table 2 provides univariate statistics for the sample of connected firms and their non
connected peers. It shows that the leverage of connected firms is significantly higher than that
of nonconnected peers (28.14% vs. 24.19%). Connected firms also enjoy significantly lower
tax rates (29.67% vs 32.7%), have larger market shares (18.04% vs. 9.48%). The accounting
performance and markettobook ratios are not different from a statistical standpoint.
However, connected firms are substantially larger (3 times as large on average, in terms of
market value of equity); they have more government ownership, and are more likely to be
former stateowned enterprises.
[Table 2 goes about here]
Each Panel in Table 3 refers to different sets of regressions, using different measures of
connections. An alternative approach would be to look at changes in leverage ratios (as well
as taxation and market share) before and after the connection’s initial date. Only for a small
proportion of firms can a precise event date be identified, however.
Connected firms have significantly higher leverage than nonconnected ones.
Furthermore, leverage is higher when connections are stronger. For example, the excess
6

Industries are defined as follows: petroleum (SIC 13, 29), consumer durables (SIC 25, 30, 3637, 50, 55, 57),

basic industry (SIC 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33), food and tobacco (SIC 12, 9, 2021, 54), construction (SIC 15
17, 32, 52), capital goods (SIC 3435, 38), transportation (SIC 4042, 4445, 47), utilities (SIC 46, 4849),
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leverage is higher for firms connected through their owner, rather than for firms connected
through a director. Leverage is the highest in cases of close relationships (coeff. = 8.29), the
nexthighest for firms connected with the king, the president, or a minister (coeff. = 3.99),
and lowest for connections with a member of parliament (coeff. = 1.28). Results are robust to
the exclusion of financial companies.
[Table 3 goes about here]
While connections ease debt financing (i.e., by reducing credit rationing constraints),
connected companies do not necessarily enjoy a benefit in the form of reduced costs of debt
financing. For the whole sample, the average interest rate on debt (interest paid/total debt) is only
marginally lower for connected firms (a difference of 0.07 percent) and far from significance
(this result is not formally reported in a table). For companies connected with a minister,
however, the average interest rate on debt is lower by 1.14 percent (pvalue = 0.05), again
supporting the view that connections with more influential politicians are worth more.

B. Taxation.
The variable tax is defined as the ratio of Income Taxes / Pretax Income × 100. In the
calculation of the tax variable, companies with negative earnings and companies that display
a tax rate above 100 percent are excluded.
The results indicate that connected firms enjoy low taxation. The difference between the
tax rate of connected versus unconnected firms, however, is not statistically significant.
Results are significant for the subgroup of firms that display stronger connections: companies
connected through their owner. Surprisingly, connections with the king, president, or a
minister are associated with insignificantly higher taxation.

textiles and trade (SIC 2223, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59), services (SIC 7273, 7576, 80, 82, 87, 89), leisure (SIC 27,
58, 70, 7879), and financial companies (SIC 6069).
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One problem with analysis of taxation is that tax breaks may be granted industry wide,
rather than for one connected firm, leading to insignificant differences across firms. To
assess this possibility, I rerun all simulations eliminating industry dummies (results not
reported for space reasons). Results are essentially unchanged after the exclusion of industry
dummies. A second limitation is that, while my tax variable captures tax breaks in the form
of special deductions, it does not reflect tax savings that occur when companies are allowed
to underreport income.
C. Market share.
Market share may come either from a real monopolistic position, from some advantage
in obtaining concessions or licenses, as well as from sizeable government contracts. Large
firms may find connections more valuable, and therefore be more likely to establish them.
Similarly, the stakes may be higher for firms that have monopoly power; therefore, these
firms may have more incentive to establish connections. Market share is measured as the
firm’s market capitalization as a proportion of the total market capitalization of all firms in
the same country and twodigit SIC industry (percent). I use market cap instead of sales
because the sample includes financial companies. However, results are similar if I use sales
instead of market capitalization and exclude financial companies. As the market share
variable is already defined at the country and industrylevel, in the regressions I do not
control for country and industry effects.
The evidence on the market share variable is particularly strong. Connected firms enjoy
a significantly higher market share. Market share is notably higher when the connection is
through the owner (coeff. = 11.60) rather than through a director (coeff. = 1.89). Similarly,
the market share is higher when the connection is through close relationships (coeff. = 13.95),
than when it is with the king, president or a minister (coeff. = 8.02). The market share is only
“marginally” higher (coeff. = 2.09) when connections are with a member of parliament.
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These results confirm that stronger connections are associated with sharper differences
between connected and nonconnected firms.
D. Accounting performance and market valuation.
Here, there are two measures of company performance/value of interest:


Return on equity (ROE) is the ratio of [(net income before preferred dividends – preferred
dividend requirement) / last year’s common equity] × 100



Markettobook is computed as the ratio of market value of (ordinary and preferred)
equity plus the book value of debt, divided by the sum of book value of equity plus book
value of debt.
One might expect connected firms to report better performance because of benefits

obtained from connections. Furthermore, better performing firms may become connected to
maintain their power and performance.

Poorly performing companies may become

connected for two reasons. First, they may look at connections as a way to obtain relief from
some of their problems. Second, firms owned or managed by politicians may be poor
performers because their managers lack the skills needed to run a successful company. In
both cases, connected firms may underperform even though connections may be value
enhancing. Connected firms might also have to devote substantial resources to their rent
seeking activities, which may well eliminate any advantage from the rents they receive (see
Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2002). De Soto (1989) argues that, in Peru, bribes
replace the taxes that companies do not pay. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) note the costs of
relationships between politicians and firms. While politicians will be willing to provide
subsidies to firms run by independent managers, they will want firms to pay them back by
pursuing social policy goals.7

7

To test for the possible level of overemployment by connected firms, I compute the ratio of the number of

employees over total assets. I regress this ratio against the connections proxies used above, as well as various
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Results indicate that connected firms are poor performers. The ROE of connected firms
is lower by 5.38 percentage points (pvalue < 0.01), and their markettobook ratio is lower
by 0.48 (difference only marginally significant). There is no clear picture as to which type of
connection is associated with lower profitability. All subgroups of connected firms exhibit
significantly lower ROE than their nonconnected peers. Companies connected through the
weakest relationships have the highest market valuation.
Given the existing evidence on the value of connections, my interpretation is that the
poor accounting performance of connected firms likely reflects exante underperformance. In
other words, the performance of these companies is low even though political connections on
average add value to the sample firms.

IV. Cross country evidence
A. Countrylevel results.
Analysis of countrylevel results is important because the benefits of political
connections may vary by country. In the British system, a member of Parliament has no
unusual power because voting occurs by party, while representatives in the U.S. vote
independently on many issues. As in many countries there are just a handful of connected
firms, I focus on the top countries in terms of (i) number of connected firms, (ii) proportion
of politically connected listed firms, or (iii) connected firms as proportion of the market
capitalization (omitting Ireland because it has only two connected firms).

control factors. In no case is there a significant difference in the level of employment by connected vs. non–
connected firms (results not reported to save space). The difference is generally very small in economic terms
(the coefficient of the connection dummy is –0.001), far from significant, and generally has the wrong sign, i.e.,
connected firms employ fewer people. The data do not allow examination of other interesting sources of costs
across countries, e.g., the remuneration of politicians who sit on boards of directors or payments made to
politicians, whether legally (i.e., campaign contributions) or illegally.
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The results are in Table 4. For all except Italy, connected firms display higher leverage.
Leverage is significantly higher for connected firms in Malaysia, Russia, and Thailand. In
Italy, leverage is not only lower, but also significantly so. In all seven countries connected
firms are subject to lower rates of taxation, but significantly lower only in Russia, where
connected firm tax rates indicate an amazing discount of 73.27 percentage points.
For five of the seven countries, connected firms have higher market share.

This

relationship is statistically significant and economically large for the Russian sample.
Connected firms exhibit lower ROE in all countries; the difference is significant in Russia
and Thailand. Firms in the U.K. exhibit significantly lower markettobook ratio. Connected
firms (insignificantly) outperform in Japan, Malaysia, and Russia.
[Table 4 goes about here]
B. Where are differences greatest?
To test whether connections are more important in countries with higher levels of
corruption, I analyze a number of interaction dummies between connections and corruption.
Table 5 shows that differences between connected and nonconnected firms are particularly
sharp in highly corrupt systems.
As proxy for corruption, I use the average of four indexes used elsewhere as measures of
perceived corruption:8 the Business International index, the International Country Risk index,
the Kaufmann, Kraay and ZoidoLobatón index (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
datasets.html#dataset), and Transparency International index (www.transparency.org).
Corruption indexes are rescaled from 0 to 10, so that lower scores correspond to lower levels
of corruption. The Business International’s (Economist Intelligence Unit) index assesses the
“degree to which business transactions involve corruption and questionable payments”. This
assessment is compiled based upon questionnaires filled in by BI’s network of
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correspondents and analysts based in the countries covered, and reflect their perception of
corruption. The International Country Risk’s assessment of the corruption in government
indicates whether “high government officials are likely to demand special payments” and
“illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form
of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment,
policy protection, or loans.” The Kaufmann et al. corruption index is defined as the exercise
of public power for private gains, and measures various aspects, ranging from the frequency
of “additional payments to get things done” to the effects of corruption on the business
environment. “The indicator reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality
of governance of a large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing
countries, as well as nongovernmental organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and
thinktanks during 1997 and 1998”. Finally, Transparency International measures the “degree
to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a
composite index, drawing on 14 different polls and surveys from seven independent
institutions, carried out among business people and country analysts, including surveys of
residents, both local and expatriate.” Corruption represents “the abuse of public office for
private gain.”
In the leverage regression, the coefficient of the interaction between the general
connection variable and corruption is 2.04 (significant at the 1 percent level). This implies
excess leverage (over nonconnected firms) of 2.17 percentage points in the country with the
lowest corruption index (the minimum in the sample is 3.2), and 11.35 percentage points in
the country with the highest corruption index. Tax rates of connected firms are also lower in
more corrupt countries, although insignificantly so. The market share of connected firms
increases significantly with corruption (coefficient = 2.58, pvalue < 0.01).

8

The same results obtain if the individual indexes are used.
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Interestingly, while the accounting performance of connected firms significantly
deteriorates with the level of corruption in the country, their markettobook ratio does not
change. In countries with higher corruption, this may suggest that while connected firms are
relatively inefficient, connections provide them benefits that allow to more than compensate
for any lack of management skills.
Table 5 also confirms that the type and strength of connections matters. For leverage
and market share a connection through the owner, rather than through a director, has a greater
marginal effect when corruption increases. Firms connected with the king, president, or a
minister exhibit increasing differences in their leverage as corruption increases, while firms
connected through close relationships and those connected with a member of Parliament
exhibit greater differences in their ROE as corruption increases.
[Table 5 goes about here]
V. Robustness tests.
I perform a number of robustness tests in order to assess the robustness of the previous
results. The sample is first split between countries with corruption above the sample median
(Table 6, Panel A), and countries with corruption equal to or below the median (Panel B).
The excess leverage and the market share of connected firms are significant in highly corrupt
countries; market share is also significant in countries with relatively low corruption. The
marginal impact of connections on leverage appears particularly great in countries with
higher corruption. As before, taxation is never significant. For both samples, the ROE of
connected firms is significantly worse. This poorer accounting performance does not result
in belowmarket valuation when the connected firm operates in a country with higher
corruption, however.
Panel C of Table 6 excludes Malaysia and Indonesia, as Fisman (2001) and Johnson and
Mitton (2003) have already documented substantial effects associated with connections in
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those countries. The basic results continue to hold after excluding these two countries.
Exclusion of the UK and the US (with most firms) does not change the results, either.
Panel D excludes financial firms (SIC 60006999). Nonfinancial connected companies
continue to exhibit significantly higher leverage than their peers, and significantly greater
market shares. Once again, they significantly underperform on an accounting basis.
Panel E excludes governmentcontrolled and privatized firms, whose objectives may be
other than to maximize shareholder value, and which may exhibit abnormal ratios. Results
are qualitatively unchanged after this exclusion. Finally, results do not appear to be driven by
outliers (Panel F). Key results in fact are robust to truncating the data at the 5th and 95th
percentiles of observations for the dependent variable.
[Table 6 goes about here]
VI.

Endogeneity/causality concerns.

A. Anecdotal evidence.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that connected firms enjoy easier access to debt financing
from statecontrolled banks, even though they are not worth this extra credit. For example, in
1982, a company owned by Daim Zainuddin (former Malay Deputy Prime Minister and close
friend of Prime Minister Mahathir), Baktimu Sdn Bhd, acquired a 33 percent stake in Sime
UEP, for RM 75m cash. “Part of the loan for the acquisition, amounting to RM 40m, was
obtained from the Singapore branch of the Union Bank of Switzerland; the loan was
approved by the Union Bank only after the governmentowned Bank Bimiputra issued a
guarantee on Bakrimu’s behalf as security for the credit” (Asian Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24,
1984; Gomez and Jomo, 1997, pp. 5455).

In 1986, François Pinault, the controlling

shareholder of Pinault SA (France) obtained a 250 million FF grant from the government
(US$40 million). By 1997, Crédit Lyonnais’ credits and stakes in Pinault had reached a
value of 12 billion FF (US$2.14 billion) (Calvi and Meurice, 1999; Gay and Monnot, 1999).

17

Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was accused of financing his television
empire through the “large helping hand [of] publicsector banks, which provided bigger loans
than Fininvest’s creditworthiness seemed to merit” (The Economist, 2001a).
Similarly, evidence suggests that connections lead to preferential tax treatment. In 1996,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree giving tax breaks and other aid potentially
worth more than US$ 1 billion to Norilsk Nickel, one of the country’s richest and most
influential industrial giants.

Norilsk was controlled by Uneximbank, whose president

Vladimir Potanin was shortly thereafter appointed deputy prime minister (The Moscow
Times, 1996). Similarly, when in 1996 Pinault SA obtained the cash contribution from the
French government, it was also given a tax exemption of 250 million FF (Gay and Monnot,
1999).
Anecdotes on market power are legion. As described in Backman (1999, pp. 266268),
“money from the [Suharto] family’s startup capital came from having themselves granted
import monopolies. One of the earliest such monopolies was an exclusive license for the
import of raw materials for plastic, granted in 1984.” Similarly, Malay crony capitalists are
rentseeking “private sector businessmen who benefit enormously from close relations” with
government leaders by obtaining “not only protection from foreign competition, but also
concessions, licenses, monopoly rights, and government subsidies” (Yoshihara, 1988, pp. 3
4, 71). Relationships became so widespread that by 1995 almost 20 percent of the Malay
ruling party’s division chairmen were millionaire businessmen (Gomez and Jomo, 1997, p.
26). In the Philippines, connected firms could easily obtain licenses by paying a 10 percent
fee (Hutchcroft, 1998, p.73).
B. Formal tests.
The anecdotal evidence reported above supports the view that greater market share,
higher leverage, and/or lower taxation arise as a consequence of connections. However, the
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relationship between market share (and other “benefits”) and political connections is
potentially endogenous: the owner or manager of a large and important firm in the country
may simply have a greater chance to enter politics.
I first attempt to control for reverse causality in the results by distinguishing connections
based on the political experience of the politician involved. The idea being that, if higher
leverage proxies for preferential access to credit that follow the connection, then this “excess
leverage” should increase with the length of the connection. For this purpose I use the
following two variables: Connected with seasoned politician is a dummy that equals one if
the relevant connection had at least ten years of tenure as a politician in 1997;9 Connected
with unseasoned politician is a dummy that equals one if the politician was appointed after
1987.
Results in Table 7 show that companies connected to a seasoned politician display
significantly lower tax rates than their peers, while firms connected to a younger politician do
not. Second, firms connected with a seasoned politician enjoy higher market share (coeff. =
9.29) than firms connected with an unseasoned politician (coeff. = 5.25).

However, a

connection with an unseasoned politician (rather than with a seasoned politician) is associated
with insignificantly higher leverage than a connection with a more senior official (coeff. =
4.34 vs. 4.21). These results are overall consistent with the idea that access to privileges
increases (benefits have time to “pile up”) when connections are dated longer.
[Table 7 goes about here]
Alternatively, the direction of causality could formally be tested by using a twostage
approach. Hence, I rerun all regressions using such an approach.10 In particular, in the first

9

The date of initial appointment of each politician is determined from sources listed in

http://www2.owen.vanderbilt.edu/marafaccio/AppendixA.doc, Panel G. When I cannot identify the initial year
of appointment, I classify the firm as connected with an unseasoned politician.
10

Results are available from the author upon request.
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stage I regress each connections dummy against firm size (log of the lagged value of market
capitalization, or log of the lagged value of total assets); lagged accounting performance (i.e.,
ROE); and country and industry dummies. I then use the predicted values of connections as
regressors in the second stage, and rerun the previous regressions. All secondstage results
are consistent (in sign and significance) with the results discussed earlier.

VII. Conclusion.
Several findings on the relationship between politics and business are revealed in this
examination of connected corporations across several countries. Connected companies differ
sharply from those not connected. On average, leverage is higher in connected corporations.
Connected firms also enjoy lower taxation, and they display much greater market power.
Connected firms display lower ROE and market valuation than their peers. These results are
generally consistent across countries. This evidence is consistent with, and complements the
results in previous studies of preferential access to credit by politically connected firms. For
example, Kwaja and Mian (2004) show that Pakistani connected firms enjoy greater access to
debt financing and, although they exhibit significantly higher default rates, they pay no
higher interest rates than their nonconnected peers.11 To the best of my knowledge, however,
this is the first study to document systematically tax discounts or strong market positions to
the advantage of connected entrepreneurs.
I also show that differences between connected and nonconnected firms become more
important when political links are stronger. Greater differences are found when companies
are connected through owners (rather than directors), through close relationships, or
connected with a minister (rather than a member of parliament). Differences are also greater
when the firm operates in countries with higher degrees of corruption. This last result, in
11

Empirical evidence of higher borrowing by politically connected firms is also reported in Chiu and Joh

(2004), Cull and Xu (2005), and Johnson and Mitton (2003).
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particular complements the findings in Faccio (2006), who shows larger net benefits of
connections in more corrupt countries. This paper indicates some of the channels through
which such increase in value is realized.
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Table 1. Country Distribution of Firms with Political Connections.
No. of firms with available data is the number of firms with financial data available in Worldscope. No. of
connected firms is the number of firms whose controlling shareholder or top director sits on a national
parliament, government, is king/president of the country, or is closely related to a top politician/political party

Country
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands

No. of firms with
available data
34
257
87
104
127
438
71
58
172
91
519
507
90
381
26
257
116
52
47
178
2,322
418
68
179

No. of connected
firms
0
2
1
5
0
6
2
0
7
2
19
10
1
7
1
8
27
2
2
21
30
81
7
1

Country
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russian Fed.
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
U.K.
U.S.A.
Venezuela
Colombia
Luxembourg
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Zimbabwe

No. of firms with
available data
47
113
24
100
32
60
11
215
188
271
138
172
180
204
78
1,417
6,007
17
32
23
18
237
8

No. of connected
firms
0
0
0
5
0
3
4
16
0
7
1
3
4
32
1
119
13
0
0
1
0
7
0

All countries

16,191

458
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Connected companies are those whose controlling shareholder or top director sits on a national parliament,
government, is king/president of the country, or is closely related to a top politician/political party. Leverage is
defined as longterm debt (excluding the current portion of longterm debt, pensions, deferred taxes, and
minority interest) over total capital × 100. Total capital represents the total investment in the company: the sum
of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, longterm debt, nonequity reserves, and deferred tax
liability in untaxed reserves. Tax is income taxes over pretax income × 100. Market share is firm’s market
capitalization over the total market capitalization of all firms in the same country and twodigit SIC industry
(%). ROE is computed as [(Net income before preferred dividends – preferred dividend requirement) / last
year’s common equity] × 100. Markettobook is the ratio of market value of (ordinary and preferred) equity
plus the book value of debt, divided by the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt. Mkcap is the
company’s market capitalization, defined as market price as of year end × common shares outstanding (in
millions of US$). State represents the voting stake held by the central and local government. It is calculated by
identifying the weakest link in each control chain linking the corporation to the controlling shareholder, then
summing the percentage control rights across these links. Privatized is a dummy that equals 1 if the company is
a privatized firm, and 0 otherwise. Dually listed is a dummy that equals 1 if the company is listed on at least two
stock markets, and 0 otherwise.
Connected
Mean
Median
Leverage
Tax
Market share
ROE
Markettobook
Mkcap ($M)
State (%)
Privatized (%)
Dually listed (%)

28.14
29.67
18.04
6.29
2.09
3,634.65
1.79
4.37
21.40

22.67
30.00
5.26
8.78
1.29
309.41
0.00

Nonconnected
Mean
Median
24.19
32.70
9.48
6.87
2.77
1,265.04
0.88
1.33
20.78
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18.62
34.43
0.61
8.63
1.46
166.85
0.00

Ttest

Kruskal
Wallis test

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.78
0.66
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.04

Test of
proportion

0.00
0.75

Table 3: Characteristics of Connected Firms.
All regressions control for whether the firm has recently been privatized, or is statecontrolled, or is dually
listed, as well as for firm size (ln{mkcap}). Leverage, Tax, ROE, and Stock return regressions include country
and industry dummies. Industry is defined according to Campbell (1996). Coefficients for control variables
are not reported to save space. Leverage is defined as longterm debt (excluding the current portion of long
term debt, pensions, deferred taxes, and minority interest) over total capital × 100. Total capital represents the
total investment in the company: the sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, longterm debt,
nonequity reserves, and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. Tax is income taxes over pretax income ×
100. Market share is firm’s market capitalization over the total market capitalization of all firms in the same
country and twodigit SIC industry (%). ROE is computed as [(Net income before preferred dividends –
preferred dividend requirement) / last year’s common equity] × 100. Markettobook is the ratio of market
value of (ordinary and preferred) equity plus the book value of debt, divided by the sum of book value of equity
plus book value of debt. Connected is a dummy that equals 1 if the a company’s controlling shareholder or top
director sits on a national parliament, government, is king/president of the country, or is closely related to a top
politician/political party, and 0 otherwise. Connected through the owner is a dummy that equals 1 if the
company’s controlling shareholder sits in a national parliament, holds office in the government, is the head of
state, or is closely related to a top politician/political party, and 0 otherwise Connected through a director is a
dummy that equals 1 if a company’s top director sits in a national parliament, holds office in the government, is
the head of state, or is closely related to a top politician/political party, and 0 otherwise. Connected with king,
president or minister is a dummy that equals 1 if a controlling shareholder or top director of the company holds
a government office, or is king/president of the country, and 0 otherwise. Connected with MP is a dummy that
equals 1 if a controlling shareholder or top director of the company sits in a national parliament, and 0
otherwise. Close relationships is a dummy that equals 1 if a controlling shareholder or top director of a company
is closely related to at least one top politician, and 0 otherwise. Close relationships include: (i) friendship, (ii)
former heads of state or prime ministers (and their relatives), (iii) directorships covered by current politicians in
1997, who recently left the firm, (iv) connections with foreign politicians, and (v) wellknown cases of
relationships with political parties. Standard errors (reported in parentheses below the coefficients) are
computed using Huber/White correction for heteroskedasticity (see White, 1980). a, b, c: Significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level. Each panel refers to separate regressions, and each column to a
different regression.
Leverage

Tax

Market
share

ROE

Marketto
book

6.30 a
(1.21)

–5.38 a
(1.47)

–0.48 c
(0.29)

–0.11
(0.34)

Panel A: General results
3.51 a
(1.29)

Connected

–0.73
(0.88)

Panel B: Director vs. shareholder connection
Connected through the owner

4.27 b
(1.95)

–2.60 c
(1.47)

11.60 a
(1.95)

–5.76 b
(2.43)

Connected through a director

2.08
(1.62)

0.33
(1.02)

1.89
(1.44)

–3.76
(1.72)

b

–0.66 c
(0.34)

Panel C: Connections with members of parliament vs. connections with ministers
Connected with king, president, or minister

3.99
(3.83)

0.83
(2.54)

8.02 b
(3.18)

–6.96 c
(4.18)

Connected with MP

1.28
(1.62)

–1.01
(1.01)

2.09
(1.39)

–3.58
(1.73)

Close relationships

8.29
(2.31)

a

–0.75
(2.05)

13.95
(2.63)

a

–8.78
(3.05)

26

0.36
(0.61)

b

–0.75 b
(0.36)

a

–0.30
(0.39)

Table 3: Characteristics of Connected Firms (Cont’d).

Leverage

Tax

Market
share

ROE

Marketto
book

Memo items
N. Obs. Panels A–C
Country dummies
Industry dummies
Estimation technique

16,138
Yes
Yes
Tobit
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12,304
Yes
Yes
Tobit

16,147
No
No
Tobit

16,190
Yes
Yes
OLS

16,143
Yes
Yes
OLS

Table 4: CountryLevel Regressions.
All regressions except market share control for whether the firm has recently been privatized, and whether it is
statecontrolled, dually listed, operates in the financial industry (SIC between 6000 and 6999), as well as for
firm size (ln{mkcap}). The market share regressions control for all these effects except industry. All
regressions include an intercept. Coefficients for these control variables are not reported save space. Leverage
is defined as longterm debt (excluding the current portion of longterm debt, pensions, deferred taxes, and
minority interest) over total capital × 100. Total capital represents the total investment in the company: the sum
of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, longterm debt, nonequity reserves, and deferred tax
liability in untaxed reserves. Tax is income taxes over pretax income × 100. Market share is firm’s market
capitalization over the total market capitalization of all firms in the same country and twodigit SIC industry
(%). ROE is computed as [(Net income before preferred dividends – preferred dividend requirement) / last
year’s common equity] × 100. Markettobook is the ratio of market value of (ordinary and preferred) equity
plus the book value of debt, divided by the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt. Connected is a
dummy that equals 1 if the a company’s controlling shareholder or top director sits on a national parliament,
government, is king/president of the country, or is closely related to a top politician/political party, and 0
otherwise. Standard errors (reported in parentheses below the coefficients) are computed using Huber/White
correction for heteroskedasticity (see White, 1980). a, b, c: Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or
10% level. Horizontal lines separate different regressions, and each column refers to a different regression.

Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

Leverage

Tax

Market share
Indonesia

4.26
(6.08)

–1.56
(6.49)

0.07; 116

<0; 66

ROE

Markettobook

–5.21
(7.28)

–10.32
(7.10)

–0.18
(0.14)

<0; 106

0.07; 115

0.28; 116

3.89
(5.55)

–1.54
(2.61)

–0.52
(0.43)

0.04; 178

0.18; 173

0.16; 178

Italy
b

Connected

–11.15
(5.47)

R2 adj.; N. Obs.

0.23: 178

–3.99
(3.52)
<0; 149
Japan

Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

0.59
(4.78)

–4.08
(2.62)

2.18
(1.65)

–0.02
(2.54)

0.24
(0.15)

0.02; 2,322

0.01; 1,786

0.16; 2,322

0.03; 2,314

0.10; 2,322

1.52
(3.31)

–3.80
(4.52)

0.19
(0.77)

0.07; 418

0.01; 391

0.04; 418

88.32 a
(30.92)

–7.48 c
(2.21)

0.61
(1.18)

0.19; 8
Thailand

0.08; 11

0.58; 6

0.24; 11

Malaysia
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.
Connected

a

12.31
(2.92)

0.05; 418
9.79 a
(2.26)

–0.79
(2.55)
0.06; 300
Russia
–73.27 b
(31.26)

R2 adj.; N. Obs.

0.47; 11

Connected

20.44
(7.53)

–3.40
(5.38)

–9.20
(4.39)

–24.65
(8.83)

0.07; 204

<0; 119

0.27; 204

0.02; 204

0.03; 204

3.55
(2.37)

–1.48
(1.16)

2.35
(1.74)

–5.28
(4.28)

–0.70 b
(0.34)

R2 adj.; N. Obs.

0.05; 1,417

0.04; 1,200

0.15; 1,416

0.03; 1,367

0.04; 1,417

Estim. technique

Tobit

Tobit

Tobit

OLS

OLS

R2 adj.; N. Obs.

a

b

a

–0.06
(0.24)

U.K.
Connected
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Table 5: Differences Across Countries.
Panels report different regressions, and each column refers to a different regression. All regressions control for
whether the firm is politically connected, has recently been privatized, is statecontrolled, dually listed, as well
as for firm size (ln{mkcap}). Leverage, Tax, ROE, and Stock return regressions include country and industry
dummies. Industry is defined according to Campbell (1996). Coefficients for these control variables are not
reported to save space. Leverage is defined as longterm debt (excluding the current portion of longterm debt,
pensions, deferred taxes, and minority interest) over total capital × 100. Total capital represents the total
investment in the company: the sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, longterm debt, non
equity reserves, and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. Tax is income taxes over pretax income × 100.
Market share is firm’s market capitalization over the total market capitalization of all firms in the same country
and twodigit SIC industry (%). ROE is computed as [(Net income before preferred dividends – preferred
dividend requirement) / last year’s common equity] × 100. Markettobook is the ratio of market value of
(ordinary and preferred) equity plus the book value of debt, divided by the sum of book value of equity plus
book value of debt. Connected is a dummy that equals 1 if the a company’s controlling shareholder or top
director sits on a national parliament, government, is king/president of the country, or is closely related to a top
politician/political party, and 0 otherwise. Connected through the owner is a dummy that equals 1 if the
company’s controlling shareholder sits in a national parliament, holds office in the government, is the head of
state, or is closely related to a top politician/political party, and 0 otherwise Connected through a director is a
dummy that equals 1 if a company’s top director sits in a national parliament, holds office in the government, is
the head of state, or is closely related to a top politician/political party, and 0 otherwise. Connected with king,
president or minister is a dummy that equals 1 if a controlling shareholder or top director of the company holds
a government office, or is king/president of the country, and 0 otherwise. Connected with MP is a dummy that
equals 1 if a controlling shareholder or top director of the company sits in a national parliament, and 0
otherwise. Close relationships is a dummy that equals 1 if a controlling shareholder or top director of a
company is closely related to at least one top politician, and 0 otherwise. Close relationships include: (i)
friendship, (ii) former heads of state or prime ministers (and their relatives), (iii) directorships covered by
current politicians in 1997, who recently left the firm, (iv) connections with foreign politicians, and (v) well
known cases of relationships with political parties. Standard errors (reported in parentheses below the
coefficients) are computed using Huber/White correction for heteroskedasticity (see White, 1980). a, b, c:
Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.

Leverage

Tax

Market
share

ROE

Marketto
book

Panel A: General results
b

b

Connected

–4.36
(2.14)

–1.37
(1.44)

–1.46
(2.03)

5.54
(2.37)

–0.05
(0.55)

Connected × Ave. Corruption

2.04 a
(0.66)

–0.45
(0.52)

2.58 a
(0.61)

–2.99 a
(0.77)

–0.36
(0.37)

–0.34
(3.18)

1.22
(4.38)

10.87
(4.73)

b

0.19
(0.77)

Panel B: Director vs. shareholder connection
a

Connected through the owner

–13.46
(4.00)

Connected through a director

–0.85
(2.63)

–2.55
(1.72)

–1.71
(2.43)

2.59
(2.83)

–0.08
(0.52)

Connected through the owner × Ave. Corruption

3.54
(0.96)

a

–0.80
(0.81)

2.33
(0.98)

b

–3.90
(1.15)

a

–0.36
(0.35)

Connected through a director × Ave. Corruption

0.95
(1.15)

0.52
(0.86)

1.85
(0.98)

c

–1.57
(1.13)

–0.35
(0.33)
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Table 5: Differences Across Countries (Cont’d).

Leverage

Tax

Market
share

ROE

Marketto
book

Panel C: Connections with members of parliament vs. connections with ministers
–16.72
(7.95)

Connected with king, president, or minister

b

1.98
(5.17)

–0.80
(7.12)

2.19
(6.31)

0.98
(1.31)

Connected with MP

–1.37
(2.81)

–2.32
(1.76)

–1.24
(2.30)

5.22
(2.96)

c

–0.09
(0.57)

Close relationships

–7.95
(5.06)

–0.18
(4.62)

4.65
(6.82)

5.52
(6.38)

0.06
(0.90)

Connected with king, president, or minister × Ave. Corruption

4.24
(1.56)

a

–1.38
(1.07)

1.94
(1.48)

–2.52
(1.68)

–0.48
(0.42)

Connected with MP × Ave. Corruption

0.89
(1.29)

0.03
(0.90)

1.71
(0.90)

c

–2.54
(1.17)

Close relationships × Ave. Corruption

2.78
(1.23)

b

–0.63
(1.18)

2.13
(1.47)

12,304
Yes
Yes
Tobit

16,147
No
No
Tobit

b

–0.40
(0.37)

–3.10
(1.39)

b

–0.39
(0.36)

16,190
Yes
Yes
OLS

16,143
Yes
Yes
OLS

Memo items
N. Obs. Panels A–C
Country dummies
Industry dummies
Estimation technique

16,138
Yes
Yes
Tobit
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Table 6: Robustness Tests.
Panels report different regressions, and each column refers to a different regression. Generally, all regressions
control for whether the firm is politically connected, has recently been privatized, is statecontrolled, dually
listed, as well as for firm size (ln{mkcap}). Regressions in Panel E, however, do not control for whether the
firm has recently been privatized or is statecontrolled. Leverage, Tax, ROE, and Stock return regressions
include country and industry dummies. Industry is defined according to Campbell (1996). Coefficients for
these control variables are not reported to save space. Leverage is defined as longterm debt (excluding the
current portion of longterm debt, pensions, deferred taxes, and minority interest) over total capital × 100.
Total capital represents the total investment in the company: the sum of common equity, preferred stock,
minority interest, longterm debt, nonequity reserves, and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. Tax is
income taxes over pretax income × 100. Market share is firm’s market capitalization over the total market
capitalization of all firms in the same country and twodigit SIC industry (%). ROE is computed as [(Net
income before preferred dividends – preferred dividend requirement) / last year’s common equity] × 100.
Markettobook is the ratio of market value of (ordinary and preferred) equity plus the book value of debt,
divided by the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt. Connected is a dummy that equals 1 if the
a company’s controlling shareholder or top director sits on a national parliament, government, is king/president
of the country, or is closely related to a top politician/political party, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (reported
in parentheses below the coefficients) are computed using Huber/White correction for heteroskedasticity (see
White, 1980). a, b, c: Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
Leverage

Tax

Market share

ROE

Markettobook

Panel A: Countries with corruption above the sample median
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

a

b

b

5.35
(1.89)

–2.37
(1.50)

3.90
(1.78)

–5.25
(2.09)

–0.67
(0.63)

NA; 5,241

NA; 3,927

0.03; 5,244

0.21; 5,084

0.02; 5,242

Panel B: Countries with corruption equal or below the sample median
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

1.69
(1.72)

0.68
(1.00)

5.22
(1.64)

–5.14
(2.12)

–0.47 b
(0.20)

NA; 10,897

NA; 8,377

0.02; 10,903

0.06; 10,310

<0; 10,901

a

b

Panel C: All countries except Malaysia and Indonesia
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

2.73
(1.46)

–0.11
(0.92)

5.11
(1.34)

–5.19
(1.56)

–0.64 b
(0.30)

NA; 15,604

NA; 11,938

0.01; 15,613

0.07; 14,888

0.01; 15,609

c

a

a

Panel D: All industries except financial services (SIC: 60006999)
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

2.69 b
(1.37)

–1.25
(1.03)

8.02 a
(1.57)

–4.74 a
(1.79)

–0.55
(0.43)

NA; 12,887

NA; 9,548

0.02; 12,893

0.08; 12,280

0.03; 12,891

Panel E: All companies except governmentcontrolled and privatized firms
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.

a

a

a

3.49
(1.36)

–0.41
(0.93)

6.12
(1.24)

–5.41
(1.61)

–0.57
(0.35)

NA; 15,395

NA; 11,692

<0; 15,404

0.07; 14,658

0.02; 15,400

Panel F: Dependent variable truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles
Connected
R2 adj.; N. Obs.
Country dummies
Industry dummies
Estim. technique

c

a

b

1.84
(1.11)

–0.08
(0.69)

4.73
(0.70)

–1.35
(0.68)

–0.06
(0.04)

NA; 13,288
Yes
Yes
Tobit

NA; 11,272
Yes
Yes
Tobit

0.05; 14,572
No
No
Tobit

0.18; 13,852
Yes
Yes
OLS

0.27; 14,501
Yes
Yes
OLS
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Table 7: Connections with long–term vs. short–term politicians
All regressions control for whether the firm has recently been privatized, or is statecontrolled, or is dually
listed, as well as for firm size (ln{mkcap}). Leverage, Tax, ROE, and Stock return regressions include country
and industry dummies. Industry is defined according to Campbell (1996). Coefficients for control variables
are not reported to save space. Leverage is defined as longterm debt (excluding the current portion of long
term debt, pensions, deferred taxes, and minority interest) over total capital × 100. Total capital represents the
total investment in the company: the sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, longterm debt,
nonequity reserves, and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. Tax is income taxes over pretax income ×
100. Market share is firm’s market capitalization over the total market capitalization of all firms in the same
country and twodigit SIC industry (%). Connected with seasoned politician is a dummy that equals 1 if the
connected politician was first appointed in or before 1987, and 0 otherwise. Connected with unseasoned
politician is a dummy that equals 1 if the connected politician was first appointed after 1987, and 0 otherwise.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses below the coefficients) are computed using Huber/White correction for
heteroskedasticity (see White, 1980). a, b, c: Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
Leverage

Tax

Market share

Connected with seasoned politician

4.21
(2.08)

b

–2.96
(1.69)

c

a

Connected with unseasoned politician

4.34
(2.00)

b

1.11
(1.18)

5.25
(1.85)

16,138
Yes
Yes
Tobit

12,304
Yes
Yes
Tobit

16,147
No
No
Tobit

9.29
(2.14)
a

Memo items
N. Obs.
Country dummies
Industry dummies
Estimation technique
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